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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND UNWARRANTED GPS 
SURVEILLANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF 
APPEALS’ DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. MAYNARD 
INTRODUCTION 
In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases to deal with modern technology 
and its implications on the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Justice Brandeis expounded the Framers’ purpose behind 
adopting the Amendment in his famous dissent, stating: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. . . . They conferred, as against the Government, the right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, 
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 
Modern day advances in technology have pushed the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection, challenging courts to face these limits head on.  The 
conflict between the public interest in protecting citizens against criminal 
activity and the preciousness of individual privacy has come to a head in cases 
involving electronic surveillance.2  In United States v. Maynard, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether the warrantless use of a 
global positioning system (hereinafter “GPS”) tracking device on a criminal 
suspect’s car for a month long period of time constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, whether or not this was a 
violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights.3  The D.C. Circuit Court 
distinguished its case from relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence4 and 
numerous other circuits5 by holding that the tracking did constitute a search 
and violated the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy.6 
 
 1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 2. Renee M. Pomerance, Redefining Privacy in the Face of New Technologies: Data 
Mining and the Threat to the “Inviolate Personality,” 9 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 277 (2005). 
 3. 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 4. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
 5. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 
605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 6. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–65.  This Article was written prior to the Supreme Court’s 
grant of certiorari The United States Supreme Court granted certiori on June 27, 2011.  Maynard, 
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This Note explores the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and the recent circuit split regarding warrantless use of GPS devices.  The first 
section of this paper lays out the relevant precedent on Fourth Amendment 
searches with respect to the Maynard decision.  The second section explores 
decisions by circuit courts that have found that the warrantless use of GPS 
trackers does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The third section of this Note explains the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
analysis and decision in Maynard.  This Note concludes by analyzing Maynard 
and discusses the reasons why the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Maynard was 
correct. 
I.  FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The General Framework of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens from 
unwanted governmental intrusions.7  It grants people the right to be free from 
governmental intrusion and to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”8  The usual principal 
inquiry when the Fourth Amendment is implicated is whether or not the 
governmental action constituted a search.9 
If an action amounts to a search, then the Fourth Amendment requires that 
search to be reasonable in order to be constitutionally valid.10  What is 
reasonable depends on the context within which the search takes place.11  Once 
it is established that a search has occurred, a search conducted without a 
warrant is “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only 
 
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 
(2011).  Oral arguments took place on November 8, 2011.  United States v. Jones, 2011 WL 
5360051.  The Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones on January 23, 2012.  United States 
v. Jones, 2012 WL 171117.  All nine Justices concluded that a search occurred in Jones.  Id.  
Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan agreed that Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy 
was violated.  Id. at *17 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 7. There is debate over whether the Court or Congress is better suited to police technology 
enhanced searches.  See Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search: Intrusiveness and 
the Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1189 n.22 (2010).  For the purposes of this 
Article, I will only explore the Court’s regulation of searches. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment, in full, provides the following: 
  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
 9. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
 10. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). 
 11. Id. 
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to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”12  Warrants 
are required to protect individuals from the harms the Fourth Amendment was 
meant to protect against and as a practical measure, to force police to make a 
record before a search rather than allowing them to conduct a search without 
prior investigation or without oversight from a neutral judicial magistrate.13  If 
police obtain evidence from a warrantless search, any such evidence may be 
excluded later at the defendant’s criminal trial.14  Therefore, defining certain 
police actions as searches “yields significant implications for police 
investigative techniques and procedure, as well as the conduct of any resulting 
criminal trial.”15 
The presumption for requiring a warrant, however, does not even come 
into play unless there is a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, so the most pertinent issue when beginning the Fourth 
Amendment analysis is whether or not an action constitutes a search.16  A 
search occurs when a governmental intrusion infringes on an individual’s 
legitimate expectation of privacy.17  That expectation of privacy must be one 
which society considers reasonable.18  In other words, a legitimate expectation 
of privacy must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment, such as an 
understanding that is recognized or permitted by society.19 
B. Defining a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In United States v. Katz, the United States Supreme Court overruled 
Olmstead v. United States20 and held that the reach of the Fourth Amendment 
 
 12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted).  As Justice Thomas 
recognized in his dissent in Groh v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court has “vacillated between 
imposing a categorical warrant requirement and applying a general reasonableness standard.”  
540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  He listed some of the common exceptions to 
the warrant requirement in his dissent and highlighted the debate among Supreme Court Justices 
as to whether there actually is a warrant requirement or whether the Fourth Amendment merely 
requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, and obtaining a warrant is a factor in that 
analysis.  Id. at 571–72. 
 13. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).  Evidence may not be excluded if it was 
obtained in a manner which satisfies an exception to the warrant requirement.  See Ramirez, 540 
U.S. at 571–72 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 15. April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. 
L. REV. 661, 671 (2005). 
 16. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. 
 17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 18. Id. 
 19. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 n.22 (1984). 
 20. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the interception of private telephone 
conversations by means of wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
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does not turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure.21  Rather, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.22  The Court explained this, saying, “[w]herever a 
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”23  In Katz, the government was permitted to introduce 
evidence at trial of the defendant’s telephone conversations in a public phone 
booth, which had been taped by FBI agents.24  The Court emphasized that 
these calls occurred in the public sphere, stating, “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not the subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”25  The Court did state that there may be some 
privacy and Fourth Amendment protection when a defendant sought to 
preserve something as private, even in an area accessible to the public.26  For 
instance, the defendant did not lose his right to exclude the uninvited ear 
simply because he placed his telephone call from a public place, and the Court 
stressed that to read the Constitution more narrowly “is to ignore the vital role 
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”27 
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan elaborated on the Court’s explanation, 
laying out the seminal test for what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.28  The application of the Fourth Amendment depends, at the outset, on 
whether or not the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, 
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by 
government action.29  Justice Harlan split this inquiry into two parts.30  First, 
courts must determine whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an 
actual subjective expectation of privacy;31 that is, whether the individual has 
shown that he seeks to preserve something as private.32  Second, the test 
 
 21. 389 U.S. at 353 (1967). 
 22. Id. at 351. 
 23. Id. at 359. 
 24. Id. at 348. 
 25. Id. at 351. 
 26. Id. at 351–52. 
 27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 28. Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 29. Id. at 361.  Justice Harlan believed that when a person makes a phone call from a public 
phone booth, that booth becomes a “temporarily private place” that can be intruded on by 
eavesdropping.  Id. (“The critical fact in this case is that ‘[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone 
booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely 
entitled to assume’ that his conversation is not being intercepted.  The point is not that the booth 
is ‘accessible to the public’ at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose 
momentary occupant’s expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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requires an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy to be one that 
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” and is justifiable under the 
circumstances.33  Therefore, the two prongs create both subjective and 
objective elements of the test for a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
C. Expectations of Privacy in the Public Sector 
1. United States v. Knotts and Technological Enhancement of 
Surveillance Powers 
In the 1983 decision United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court applied 
Katz in holding that the use of a beeper device to track a vehicle was not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, was not a 
violation of the criminal suspect’s constitutional rights.34  In Knotts, a beeper 
that transmitted periodic signals to a radio receiver was placed in a drum of 
chemicals purchased by one of the suspect’s codefendants.35  The suspect was 
under investigation for drug manufacturing.36  The drum was placed in the 
suspect’s car, allowing police to follow the car and maintain contact, both by 
visual surveillance and a monitor that received the beeper signals.37  Police 
officers pursued the suspect’s car and at times lost the signal from the beeper, 
but with the assistance of a monitoring device in a helicopter, they were able to 
relocate it.38  Using the beeper, police obtained information on the location of 
the chemicals during three days of surveillance at the suspect’s house.39 
In its analysis, the Court first acknowledged the Katz test defining 
reasonable expectation of privacy.40  The Court stated that the government 
surveillance essentially amounted to following the automobile on public streets 
and highways.41  The Court reasoned that because the surveillance took place 
on public streets and highways, and, therefore, in the public sphere, there was a 
diminished expectation of privacy.42 
The Court relied on the 1974 decision Cardwell v. Lewis43 to articulate its 
reasoning concerning the expectation of privacy on public streets.44  In 
Cardwell, when deciding whether the examination of a car without a warrant 
 
 33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 34. 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
 35. Id. at 277. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 278. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 279. 
 40. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280. 
 41. Id at 282. 
 42. Id. at 281. 
 43. 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
 44. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
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violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Blackmun stated, “[o]ne has a lesser 
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is 
transportation . . . . It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and 
its contents are in plain view.”45  The Knotts Court reasoned that someone 
traveling in a car on public streets had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his movements from one place to another.46  The fact that the police relied on 
their own ability to follow his car and on the beeper’s signal to find the suspect 
was immaterial to the Fourth Amendment claim.47  The Court famously stated 
that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit scientific and technological 
augmentation of the police’s natural sensory abilities.48 
The Knotts Court articulated an important caveat relevant to the issue of 
potential twenty-four hour surveillance.49  The respondent in Knotts argued 
that the holding sought by the government would allow twenty-four hour 
police surveillance of anyone in the country without judicial intervention or 
oversight.50  The Court rejected that argument, disbelieving that result would 
occur but stating that, “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then 
to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”51  
The Court ultimately held that the use of the beeper raised no constitutional 
issues distinct from those raised with visual surveillance and there was no 
search under the Fourth Amendment, as monitoring the beeper signals did not 
invade a legitimate expectation of privacy.52 
2. Kyllo v. United States and Exposure to the Public 
A further modification to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence came in Kyllo v. United States.53  In Kyllo, the Supreme Court 
faced the issue of whether the use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a 
private home from a public street, when the police suspected that defendant 
was growing marijuana within the home, constituted a search of the home 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.54  The police scanned the 
defendant’s home for several minutes to determine whether or not he was 
 
 45. 417 U.S. at 590 (plurality opinion). 
 46. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–83.  The Court actually went even further than this, holding that 
even once the car was off public streets and on the person’s private premises, there was no 
expectation of privacy that extended to the visual surveillance of his car.  Id. at 282. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 283–84. 
 50. Id. at 283. 
 51. Id. at 284. 
 52. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
 53. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 29.  The thermal imaging device at issue detected heat and infra-red radiation.  Id. 
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growing marijuana.55  In its analysis of the case, the Court focused on the 
defendant’s presence in the home at the time of the scan, stating that the right 
to be free from governmental intrusion within one’s own home is at the core of 
the Fourth Amendment.56  In prior cases, the Court had held that visual 
surveillance was not a search at all;57 it stated that the case before it presented 
more than just naked-eye surveillance.58  The Court articulated the issue as a 
problem of ascertaining the limits upon the power of technology to shrink the 
realm of guaranteed privacy.59  Advancements in technology have affected the 
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment, and the Court 
stated it would “be foolish to contend” otherwise.60 
The ultimate holding of Kyllo suggested that there are differing degrees of 
permissible intrusion when it comes to technology.  The Court stated that using 
advanced technology to obtain any information from the inside of the home, 
which could not have been obtained otherwise without a physical intrusion, 
amounts to a search where the technology in question is not in general public 
use.61  The technology used in Kyllo was not incredibly advanced, and the 
Court made a point to account for more sophisticated systems that were in use 
or development.62  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that where the 
government used a device “that is not in general public use” to explore the 
details of the home that otherwise would have required physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.63 
II.  ANALYZING UNWARRANTED USE OF GPS TRACKING: A LOOK AT 
DIFFERING CIRCUITS 
Circuit courts have been faced with the issue of whether or not warrantless 
GPS tracking is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.64  A 
considerable number have found that it is not.65 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 31. 
 57. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1985) (holding that 
enhanced aerial photography of a chemical plant by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
without a warrant, was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 58. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
 59. Id. at 34. 
 60. Id. at 33–34. 
 61. Id. at 34. 
 62. Id. at 36. 
 63. Id. at 40. 
 64. For the purposes of this Article, I will not be exploring the issue of the placement of GPS 
devices on criminal suspects’ vehicles.  A number of courts have analyzed the issue, including the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, where the court faced the 
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A. Seventh Circuit 
In United States v. Garcia, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue of whether 
evidence obtained from a tracking device attached to defendant’s car should 
have been excluded at trial as illegally obtained evidence.66  The defendant in 
Garcia was found buying products to create methamphetamine.67  The police, 
without a warrant, placed a GPS device underneath the rear bumper of his car, 
allowing them to monitor the car’s travel history.68 
In deciding that the use of the GPS did not constitute a search, the court 
focused on the car’s presence in the public sphere when the police were 
tracking it.69  The court pointed out that if the police followed a car on streets 
or observed its route on “Google Earth,” there would be no search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.70  The court stated that GPS tracking was 
the same, for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment search, as the police trying 
to follow a car on a public street or by using cameras.71  However, the court 
limited its holding by emphasizing that it would be unjustified for the police to 
randomly affix GPS devices to cars to analyze suspicious driving patterns or to 
pass a law requiring all cars to have GPS devices.72  “It would be premature to 
rule that such a program of mass surveillance could not possibly raise a 
question under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”73 
The court acknowledged the implications of its holding and its potential 
effect on an individual’s privacy, stating, “[t]here is a tradeoff between security 
and privacy, and often it favors security.”74  The Seventh Circuit seemed to 
suggest in its analysis, however, that the tradeoff could very well favor privacy 
if the police actions went too far, for it ended its opinion stating, “[s]hould 
government someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of 
vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth 
Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”75 
 
issue of whether the placement of a GPS on the suspect’s vehicle undercarriage while on his 
private property violated his constitutional rights.  591 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 65. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all previously dealt with this issue.  United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 
2010); Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1212. 
 66. 474 F.3d at 995. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 997. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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B. Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Seventh Circuit in the 
decision to hold warrantless GPS tracking outside of the meaning of a Fourth 
Amendment search.76  In United States v. Marquez, the Eighth Circuit found 
that GPS devices placed on a suspect’s car did not violate a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.77  In Marquez, investigators observed the 
defendant participating in a drug ring conspiracy and arrested him after 
tracking his movements with a GPS device attached to his car and cameras set 
up around the area.78  The defendant attempted to suppress the evidence 
gathered from the GPS device.79  The district court denied the motion to 
suppress, holding that the defendant had no standing to challenge the action 
because he did not own the car to which the device was attached.80 
Despite the district court’s determination at the outset that the defendant 
had no standing to challenge the GPS surveillance, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals still engaged in an analysis of whether or not the action in question 
constituted a search.81  The court held that even if the defendant had standing 
to challenge the use of the GPS, he would have lost the challenge because his 
reasonable expectation of privacy had not been violated.82  The court quoted 
Knotts, emphasizing that a person traveling in a car on public streets has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and no search occurs where electronic 
monitoring does not invade a legitimate expectation of privacy.83  Like in 
Kyllo, the court found that surveillance in the public sphere did not raise the 
same concerns as warrantless electronic monitoring within a private 
residence.84  In sum, the court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy 
was thwarted because the police reasonably suspected that the vehicle was 
involved in interstate transport of drugs, the vehicle was not tracked while in 
private structures or on private lands, and the device merely allowed the police 
to reduce the cost of lawful surveillance.85 
C. Ninth Circuit 
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the use of a GPS 
device in tracking a drug criminal suspect’s car was not a search within the 
 
 76. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 607. 
 79. Id. at 608. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 609. 
 82. Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10. 
 83. Id. at 609. 
 84. Id. at 609–10. 
 85. Id. 
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, the failure to obtain a 
warrant did not prevent the evidence gathered from being used at trial.86  In 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, drug enforcement agents observed Juan 
Pineda-Moreno purchasing a large amount of a certain type of fertilizer, known 
to be used in the growth of marijuana.87  The agents followed Pineda-Moreno 
to his home, and after learning where he lived, they began attaching GPS 
devices to his car.88  Over a four-month period, the agents attached tracking 
devices to his vehicle on seven different occasions.89  Some of those devices 
allowed the agents to access information regarding Pineda-Moreno’s 
whereabouts from remote locations, while others required the agents to remove 
the devices and download information directly.90  Law enforcement agents 
eventually used the information from the GPS devices to track Pineda-Moreno 
as he was leaving a marijuana growth site.91  They arrested him and charged 
him with conspiracy to grow marijuana.92  When Pineda-Moreno moved to 
suppress the evidence gained from the GPS tracker, his motion was denied.93  
He appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.94 
Pineda-Moreno argued on appeal that the use of mobile tracking devices to 
monitor the location of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights because 
the devices were not generally used by the public.95  Pineda-Moreno 
acknowledged the Knotts holding but argued it should not be controlling 
because of the court’s holding later holding in Kyllo regarding advances in 
technological devices.96 
Pineda-Moreno argued that police conduct a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment whenever they obtain information using sense-
enhancing technology not available to the general public.97  The court rejected 
this argument, quoting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision that 
Knotts established following a car on a public street was “unequivocally not a 
search within the meaning of the amendment.”98  According to the Ninth 
Circuit, Pineda-Moreno had misstated the relationship between Knotts and 
 
 86. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 87. Id. at 1213. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1214. 
 92. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1216. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 
(7th Cir. 2007)).  A prior section of this Article addresses the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in 
Garcia.  See supra Part II.A. 
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Kyllo because he failed to understand the importance of the distinction between 
the settings where the surveillance had taken place in those two cases.99  The 
court stated that in Kyllo, the thermal imaging was a substitute for a search of 
the home, which was unequivocally within the meaning of a Fourth 
Amendment search, however, in Knotts, the substituted activity (following a 
car) was outside the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.100  Distinguishing on 
this point, the court stated that Pineda-Moreno failed to argue that the agents 
used tracking devices to intrude into a constitutionally protected area, since 
they were not intruding his home, and the information they collected could 
have been obtained by following his car.101  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ultimately held that the use of mobile tracking devices by agents was 
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.102 
III.  THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S SPLIT IN UNITED STATES V. MAYNARD 
A. The D.C. Circuit’s Analysis of Warrantless GPS Tracking and Fourth 
Amendment Searches 
Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard owned and managed, respectively, 
the “Levels” nightclub in the District of Columbia.103  In 2004, a local FBI task 
force began investigating the two for narcotics violations.104  That investigation 
culminated in searches, arrests, and charges for conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, among other things, on October 
24, 2005.105  At a trial ending in January 2008, a jury found both men guilty.106  
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Jones and Maynard jointly argued for five 
points of error by the trial court.107  Jones also argued that the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence gathered from the warrantless use of a GPS device to 
track his movements continuously of a month.108  The prosecution’s evidence 
gathered from the GPS device showed that Jones used his vehicle to store illicit 
 
 99. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 100. Id.  The Court affords the highest constitutional protection to the inside of the home.  See 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001) (stating that “in the sanctity of the home, all 
details are intimate details”). 
 101. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 102. Id. at 1217.  This case was subsequently denied for rehearing en banc, but a vigorous 
dissent to that denial was filed by Judges Kozinski, Reinhardt, Wardlaw, Paez, and Berzon.  
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121–26 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 103. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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drugs and money, transport money to his drug suppliers, and transport drugs.109  
Jones argued that the warrantless use of GPS violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights because it tracked his movements twenty-four hours a day for four 
weeks, defeating his reasonable expectation of privacy.110  On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit Court agreed with Jones and held that the continuous surveillance using 
a GPS tracker without a warrant defeated his reasonable expectation of privacy 
and was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.111 
The court first considered the question of whether the use of GPS was a 
search.112  The prosecution argued that United States v. Knotts was directly on 
point because “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”113  The court disagreed.114  Straying from the Seventh, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits, it held that Knotts was not controlling.115  It reasoned that 
Knotts did not control because Knotts dealt with more limited information 
discovered through police use of a beeper, as opposed to the more 
comprehensive, long-term GPS monitoring at issue.116  According to the D.C. 
Circuit, the factors distinguishing the situation in Maynard from Knotts were 
the amount and procedures of gathering the relevant information.117  The court 
relied on the fact that the Knotts Court specifically distinguished between the 
limited information discovered by the use of a beeper during discrete journeys 
and more comprehensive, sustained monitoring using a device like a GPS.118  
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit cited the Knotts Court’s reservation on the question 
of whether a warrant would be required in a case involving “twenty-four hour 
surveillance,” and its assertion that if such dragnet type law enforcement 
practices should eventually occur, constitutional issues may be implicated.119  
The court pointed to the recognition in Knotts that if a warrant was not 
required, then prolonged “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this 
country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.”120 
 
 109. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 110. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. 
 111. Id. at 555–56. 
 112. Id. at 555. 
 113. Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 556–58. 
 116. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 556–57. 
 120. Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.276, 283 (1983) (relying on the 
defendant’s argument that the beeper surveillance should have defeated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy)). 
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The court held that Knotts actually had a more limited scope than other 
circuits were willing to recognize.121  It emphasized that Knotts solely held that 
there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s movements 
from one place to another, not that the person had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements at all, or “world without end, as the Government 
would have it.”122  The court distinguished its holding from the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in Garcia because there the defendant’s challenge solely 
raised the question of whether the warrantless tracking with a GPS in and of 
itself violated the Fourth Amendment, without ever contending that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.123  The court rebuked the Seventh Circuit’s 
use of Knotts to bless all tracking of cars on public streets and liken GPS 
tracking to hypothetical practices it assumed were not searches, such as 
satellite imaging.124 
In addressing the other circuits, the D.C. Circuit Court also criticized the 
Ninth Circuit for failing to distinguish between long and short-term 
surveillance in Pineda-Moreno.125  It highlighted that the Seventh, Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, in holding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by 
warrantless GPS tracking, each expressly reserved the issue of whether 
“wholesale” or mass electronic surveillance requires a warrant.126  In addition, 
the court cited other jurisdictions which have acknowledged Knotts’ limited 
holding in relation to surveillance cases.127 
In the court’s discussion supporting their finding that the GPS tracking 
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy, it began with an application of the 
Katz test and stated that the totality of Jones’ movements over the course of a 
month was neither actually, nor constructively, exposed to the public.128  The 
government contended Jones’ movements were actually exposed to the public 
because the police lawfully could have followed him everywhere he went on 
public roads.129  In the court’s view, the government had posed the wrong 
question.130  The relevant question in considering whether something was 
 
 121. Id. at 557. 
 122. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that using 
“Google Earth” to track a suspect would not be a search). 
 125. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557–58. 
 126. Id. at 558; see United States. v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir.  2010); United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010); Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. 
 127.  Id. at 557; see also United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (“As 
did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we pretermit any ruling on worst-case situations that may 
involve persistent, extended, or unlimited violations of a warrant’s terms.”); People v. Weaver, 
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1201 (N.Y. 2009). 
 128. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560–61. 
 129. Id. at 559. 
 130. Id. 
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exposed to the public was not what another person can physically and may 
lawfully do, but rather what a reasonable person expects another might actually 
do.131  “[T]he whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not 
actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all 
those movements is effectively nil.”132 
The court itself raised the issue of whether the whole of Jones’ movements 
were constructively exposed to the public.133  “When it comes to privacy, 
however, precedent suggests that the whole may be more revealing than the 
parts.”134  All of Jones’ movements were not constructively exposed to the 
public because, “like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more than the 
individual movements it comprises.”135  The court made a bright distinction 
between long-term and short-term surveillance when analyzing constructive 
exposure and concluded that prolonged surveillance reveals more 
information.136  It explained this proposition, stating that prolonged 
surveillance can reveal intimate details about a person’s life, details not 
otherwise exposed through limited surveillance.137  Prolonged surveillance can 
enable the police to learn whether a suspect, for example, “is a weekly church 
goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an 
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or 
political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such 
facts.”138 
Of course, the finding that Jones’ actions were not exposed to the public 
and that he had an expectation of privacy did not alone suffice; the court had to 
find that Jones’ expectation of privacy was a reasonable one.139  The 
prosecution argued that since Jones was in public, his expectation of privacy in 
his movements was not reasonable.140  The court rejected this argument, 
stating, “[a] person does not leave his privacy behind when he walks out his 
front door.”141  It cited Katz for the proposition that actions which a person 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 558. 
 133. Id. at 560–61. 
 134. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) 
(stating that there is an implicit distinction between the whole and the sum of the parts in the case 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
 135. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62. 
 136. Id. at 562. 
 137. Id.  The “intimate details” argument can be traced to Justice Stewart’s dissent in Smith, 
where he stated that “such a list [of all the telephone numbers one called] . . . could easily 
reveal . . . the most intimate details of a person’s life.”  Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
 138. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 139. Id. at 563. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.142  The court found there is a societal recognition of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements over the course of a 
month.143  It supported this finding by explaining that GPS monitoring 
revealed intimate details of people’s lives and by citing various state laws, 
which it called “indicative that prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an 
expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable.”144  The court 
further distinguished Knotts and backed its argument that Knotts’ limited 
holding was not applicable to its case by pointing out the intrusion that such 
prolonged GPS tracking makes into a subject’s private affairs “stands in stark 
contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts.”145 
The government criticized the court’s potential holding, arguing that the 
effect would be to prohibit even visual surveillance of persons or vehicles 
located in public places and exposed to public view.146  The court countered 
this argument, stating that the government had not pointed to any actual 
examples of visual surveillance that would be affected by their holding.147  The 
court explained that practical considerations prevented visual surveillance from 
lasting very long and the money and manpower required to simulate the results 
of month long GPS tracking would be enormous, whereas GPS was relatively 
affordable.148  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the introduction of 
the GPS into police investigations had created an “unknown type of intrusion 
into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”149  In sum, the court held that a 
search without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable, the GPS tracking here 
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and Jones’ 
conviction should be reversed because the evidence convicting him was 
procured in violation of his constitutional rights.150 
B. Author’s Analysis of United States v. Maynard 
The D.C. Circuit Court was correct in concluding that the warrantless GPS 
tracking of Jones violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and was a 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64.  The court cited various state codes that impose penalties 
for the use of electronic tracking devices and expressly require exclusion of evidence obtained 
from such devices unless the police procured a warrant prior to tracking.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 637.7 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, 77-24a-7, 77-24a-15.5 (West 2003); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.35, 626A.37 (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (2010). 
 145. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
 146. Id. at 565. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 566, 568. 
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search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.151  There are several 
reasons why the analysis in Maynard is preferable to the analysis of the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and why warrantless GPS tracking violates 
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  First, in applying Knotts, the three 
circuits erred in their failure to distinguish between prolonged and short-term 
surveillance.152  The D.C. Circuit Court was correct to recognize that Knotts 
had a limited holding.153  Second, Justice Harlan’s test for a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Katz that the majority in Maynard relied on has 
evolved, now focusing more on the objective reasonable expectation of 
privacy, instead of the subjective, and this has important implications for GPS 
tracking cases.154  When focusing on an objective reasonable expectation to 
privacy, it becomes obvious that society is coming to recognize an expectation 
with regards to GPS tracking.155  Finally, the differences between the 
rudimentary beeper technology used in Knotts and the GPS tracking 
technology used in the later cases has an important impact on the Fourth 
Amendment search analysis.  The “substituting activities” argument made in 
Pineda-Moreno and the other cases cannot stand when one considers the 
practical impact of more advanced GPS technology.156 
1. The Limited Holding of United States v. Knotts 
The D.C. Circuit Court was correct to split from other circuits and hold 
that Knotts had a limited scope which did not apply to the facts of Jones’ 
surveillance.157  There is an admittedly sound rationale behind the idea that the 
activities exposed to the public world should not be subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Namely, it is logical to say that when an individual 
 
 151. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568. 
 152. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 
1216 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 153. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64. 
 154. Hutchins, supra note 7, at 1190–91. 
 155. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the 
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 277 tbl.1 (2002) (citing a survey which revealed that 
people were more concerned with police camera surveillance on a public street where the tapes 
were not destroyed); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 136 (2002) (“People 
thus perceive the act of tracking everywhere a person drives in public as meaningfully distinct 
from temporarily following a person, an activity which is itself a step removed from simply 
noticing the person because he or she is driving out in public.”); Reader Poll on the Growing Use 
of GPS by Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con 
tent/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html (indicating sixty percent of 3,008 responders 
believed that the use of GPS technology to track criminal suspects marks a troubling trend). 
 156. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 157. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557. 
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takes something that otherwise is private and reveals it in public (like their 
location), the individual invites the public to gain that knowledge and invites a 
certain amount of public scrutiny.158  The level of public scrutiny that the 
reasonable person actually invites when they enter the public sphere, however, 
is not as high as the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits would like to say it 
is.159  While it may include the limited information that the police obtained 
from the beeper used in Knotts, it is not likely to include the long-term and 
detailed information the police gained from their month long, twenty-four hour 
surveillance of Jones via a GPS tracker.160  This is because simply stepping out 
of one’s home and onto a public street does not necessarily expose a great 
amount of detail about personal life.161  Moreover, the public sphere does offer 
some protections, as the dissent in Pineda-Moreno recognized: “You can 
preserve your anonymity from prying eyes, even in public, by traveling at 
night, through heavy traffic, or in crowds . . . .”162  With the employment of a 
GPS device, these protections are gone, as there is no hiding from the “all-
seeing network” of GPS satellites.163 
The D.C. Circuit Court’s recognition that there is a need to distinguish 
between long-term and short-term surveillance shows that it better understood 
the necessary analysis for deciphering what constitutes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.164  It recognized that the GPS surveillance was a 
prolonged search because it was long-term surveillance as opposed to the 
limited information the police received from the use of the beeper.165  Other 
courts have also pointed to this difference in their analysis on the shortcomings 
of Knotts’ limited holding to justify the conclusion that GPS tracking does not 
constitute a search.166  An important distinction between the facts in Knotts and 
 
 158. Otterberg, supra note 15, at 686. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 675; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. 
 161. See Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and Public 
Privacy, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1146 (2010) (“When a person steps outside the four walls of her 
home, she still expects to control what personal ‘information’ gets conveyed to the public.”). 
 162. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the 
Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and 
Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1419–20 (2004) (noting that the physical environment of the 
public space can provide substantial opportunity for privacy, such as by merging into a crowd or 
by interacting with different groups of people in different contexts). 
 163. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
 164. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 165. Id. 
 166. The New York Court of Appeals recently recognized the limited scope of Knotts in its 
decision that the prolonged use of GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car constituted a search and 
its use without a warrant violated the state constitution.  People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 
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in Maynard was that the beeper in Knotts could not perform tracking on its 
own, and if no one was close enough to pick up the signal, it was lost 
forever.167  In his concurrence in Knotts, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, suggested that the holding in Knotts could potentially 
be construed as overly broad.168  Justice Stevens urged that the majority was 
not entirely correct in suggesting that the Fourth Amendment did not inhibit 
the police from augmenting the “sensory facilities bestowed upon them at 
birth” with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.169  He 
stated that while the augmentation in Knotts of using a beeper to aid in actual 
physical tracking was unobjectionable, “it by no means follows that the use of 
electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive 
concerns.”170  This language in his concurrence advocated applying Knotts in a 
more limited way, especially when the augmentation of police powers could be 
considered objectionable, as in the case of twenty-four hour GPS surveillance. 
By declining to apply Knotts to Jones’ surveillance, the D.C. Circuit Court 
in Maynard protected against the very concern that the Supreme Court deferred 
in Knotts.171  The necessary distinction between long-term and short-term 
surveillance becomes even more obvious when one looks closely at Knotts.  
There, the court articulated that its holding would not permit twenty-four hour 
surveillance without judicial supervision and that, “if such dragnet type law 
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there 
will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”172  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
acknowledged that there may be an important difference in constitutionality 
when it comes to a heightened level of surveillance.173  For example, neither 
circuit would extend its holding that warrantless GPS tracking does not 
constitute a search if the government were to initiate a massive surveillance 
campaign.174  In this concession and refusal to apply their holdings to such a 
 
1198–99 (N.Y. 2009).  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also suggested the limited holding of 
Knotts, stating, “Knotts deliberately left unanswered not only the question of whether the police 
conduct that made the monitoring possible violated the Fourth Amendment, but also the question 
of how such conduct, if illegal, will be dealt with.”  United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1517 
(5th Cir. 1984); see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (reaching a 
similar, limited scope conclusion). 
 167. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing 
en banc).  This distinction will be explored in more detail in Part III.B.3. 
 168. 460 U.S. 276, 288 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. 
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 171. Id. at 284 (majority opinion). 
 172. Id. 
 173. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 174. Id.  (“We, like the Seventh Circuit, believe that ‘[s]hould [the] government someday 
decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough 
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situation, they fail to realize that it may not take a “massive surveillance 
campaign” to trigger a violation of constitutional rights.  The Ninth Circuit 
pointed to the New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Weaver,175 and that 
court’s fear that permitting warrantless GPS tracking would support the 
unsupervised intrusion by the police into personal privacy.176  It then quoted 
Knotts, saying, “reality hardly suggests abuse.”177  The problem is that reality 
is actually beginning to suggest abuse, as evidenced by the warrantless 
prolonged surveillance of Jones in the Maynard case.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
reliance on Knotts for the proposition that there is not modern day abuse is 
further illogical because Knotts was decided in 1983, before the use of GPS 
tracking devices by the police had begun.178  In fact, in stating that “reality 
hardly suggests abuse,” the Knotts Court was quoting a 1978 decision 
regarding a search of a newspaper office.179  Searching a newspaper office is a 
far cry from the continuous, unwarranted tracking of an individual’s location in 
2010. 
The Supreme Court has recognized differing degrees of intrusion into 
privacy in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.180  By acknowledging 
differing degrees of privacy, the Court has recognized that different levels of 
justification are necessary in order to protect against constitutional 
violations.181  These differing degrees of intrusion into privacy come to light 
especially when analyzing the distinction between short-term and long-term 
surveillance.182  A higher degree of intrusion into someone’s privacy requires a 
higher level of justification, and it logically follows that the limited 
information gathered from the beeper in Knotts would not require as high of a 
burden of justification as the prolonged surveillance in Maynard. 
While an individual may be unconcerned about certain public activities 
being viewed in isolation or for a limited period of time, that same person may 
feel his or her privacy has been violated when those details are collected and 
 
to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a 
search.’” (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007))). 
 175. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
 176. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2. 
 177. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284). 
 178. President Reagan first granted civilian access to GPS in 1983.  See Otterberg, supra note 
15, at 666. 
 179. 460 U.S. at 283–284 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)). 
 180. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30 
PACE L. REV. 927, 955 (2010). 
 181. Id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20, 25 (1968) (recognizing that while the government 
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individual for a period of time, the temporary detention did not justify the greater intrusion of a 
search). 
 182. Blitz, supra note 162, at 1408–10. 
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viewed in the aggregate.183  Such prolonged surveillance and subsequent 
aggregation reveals far more details.  It may reveal more than many citizens 
would be comfortable with revealing, regardless of whether they were 
participating in illegal behavior or not,184 and the D.C. Circuit Court correctly 
recognized that in Maynard.185  A reasonable person does not expect anyone to 
monitor and retain a record of every car ride, route, destination, and how long 
he stays at each destination.186  Rather, he expects his movements to remain 
“disconnected and anonymous.”187  In sum, exposing one’s actions to the 
public may diminish an expectation of privacy, but it does not eliminate that 
expectation altogether.  The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits failed to make 
that distinction.188  The decision in Maynard correctly distinguishes between 
the prolonged surveillance of Jones and the short-term and limited beeper 
surveillance used in Knotts.  For this reason, the D.C. Circuit Court was correct 
to hold that Knotts’ limited scope did not apply and that Jones did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a 
month.189 
2. The Disappearing Subjective Analysis of a Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
In applying the Katz test for a reasonable expectation of privacy, the D.C. 
Circuit Court was correct to conclude that Jones had such an expectation in his 
movements.190  While the Katz test has both subjective and objective prongs, 
the D.C. Circuit Court relied more heavily on the objective prong, with good 
reason.191  In the time since Justice Harlan formed the test for a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, many courts have come to consider mainly the 
objective prong, leaving the subjective expectation of privacy to fall by the 
wayside.192  There is strong evidence that even the Supreme Court gives more 
credence to the objective reasonableness prong.193  In United States v. White, 
the Court articulated that the main consideration for the test is “not what the 
privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may 
be . . . . Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what 
 
 183. Id. at 1409. 
 184. Id. at 1408–10. 
 185. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 186. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
 187. Id. (citation omitted). 
 188. Otterberg, supra note 15, at 687. 
 189. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558, 563. 
 190. Id. at 563. 
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 193. Id.; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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expectations of privacy are constitutionally ‘justifiable’—what expectations 
the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant.”194 
It is impractical to heavily rely on the subjective element of this test 
because as a practical matter, most criminals will subjectively desire to shield 
their wrongdoings from the public eye.  Courts should instead focus on what 
society overall deems to be a justifiable expectation of privacy rather than 
lending too much importance to the subjective expectation of a particular 
person.  The D.C. Circuit Court’s discussion of “the whole of one’s 
movements” and how prolonged GPS tracking can lead to discovery of the 
most detailed aspects of a person’s life is in line with the current trend to 
consider the objective reasonableness prong more seriously.195  Courts must 
mainly analyze what kind of expectations a reasonable person has when 
traveling in the public sphere.196  Most reasonable persons would consider the 
constant tracking of their movements for a prolonged period and the 
subsequent ability to learn such personal details of their everyday life to be a 
violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy. 
When analyzing the objective prong, it is important to note that the general 
availability of GPS devices to the public also does not defeat the objective 
societal expectation of privacy.  In Kyllo, the Court distinguished between 
technology that was generally available to the public and technology that was 
available only to the government, such as the thermal imaging device at issue 
in that case.197  This distinction, however, is not dispositive in the case of GPS 
devices.  While useful in Kyllo, the narrow holding of that case regarding 
collecting information from inside a home does not define society’s 
expectation of privacy when it comes to GPS tracking.198  For example, most 
people reasonably expect that when they drive to the store, bystanders may 
notice them doing so.  Conversely, people generally do not reasonably expect 
a bystander to observe all of their actions in the aggregate over the course of a 
month.  Similarly, regardless of the fact that GPS devices are available for 
purchase to the public, most people do not reasonably expect someone to 
attach a GPS device to their vehicle and create a detailed log of all of their 
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activities over the course of a month.199  If one were to place all emphasis on 
the distinction of technology available for public use, the results could be 
disastrous, as many types of highly intrusive mechanisms which people would 
not expect to be in general use are realistically easily available to the public.200 
The notion that someone may be tracking individual movements using a 
GPS device generally offends society’s expectation of privacy in the public 
sphere.201  The likelihood that a bystander will observe all of one’s movements 
for a month and the likelihood that someone has attached a GPS device to their 
car in order to track all of those movements is slim enough to justify a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling in a private vehicle in the 
public sphere.202  In order to define a reasonable expectation of privacy and, in 
essence, to decide if use of a certain technology offends such an expectation in 
a certain case, emphasis should not be placed solely on the availability and use 
of that technology in general but on the specific factual circumstances of the 
surveillance.203  Society may recognize that GPS devices are readily available 
and used frequently, but it does not follow that the norm is for people to expect 
such a device to be attached to their car. 
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Moreover, to say that since GPS devices are available for general public 
use and, therefore, that unwarranted use by law enforcement of the devices 
does not encroach on Fourth Amendment rights is to run the risk of giving law 
enforcement a carte blanche when it comes to using technology.  Simply 
because a device is available to the public for misuse does not mean that courts 
should sanction any government use of the technology.  Technological 
advances in electronic surveillance are invading and posing a great threat to the 
privacy of individuals, and the utmost care must be given when defining the 
boundaries of society’s reasonable expectation of privacy.204 
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that society is coming to 
recognize an objective expectation of privacy with regards to warrantless GPS 
tracking.  Studies have shown growing concern with warrantless GPS tracking 
and similar surveillance techniques.205  Such concerns illustrate that society 
indeed is coming towards recognizing an expectation of privacy in the public 
sphere, because that concern would not be present if they did not believe there 
was a privacy expectation in public.206  The dissent in Pineda-Moreno 
recognizes this societal interest, aptly stating, “[t]here is something creepy and 
un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior.”207  One 
author has acknowledged the expansion of society’s expectation of privacy, 
saying, “it is also time to consider whether the public-private distinction, as it 
has developed over the past century and a half, makes sense in a digital 
age.”208  The D.C. Circuit Court recognized the need to reconsider such a 
distinction, and was therefore, correct in finding that Jones had a reasonable 
objective expectation to privacy which society recognizes as legitimate. 
3. The Implications of the Technological Differences Between Knotts’ 
Beeper and Maynard’s GPS 
The technological differences between using a beeper to track a suspect’s 
whereabouts and using a GPS device to do the same are substantial and have 
significant ramifications on the Fourth Amendment analysis and whether or 
not an action constitutes a search.  The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts, in 
arguing that GPS tracking was simply a substitute for normal police 
surveillance, failed to recognize the importance of these ramifications resulting 
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from the differences between the two technologies.209  That such an argument 
was a large part of their reasoning in holding that GPS tracking did not 
constitute a search shows shortsightedness in their Fourth Amendment 
analysis.210  In Maynard, the D.C. Circuit Court correctly refrained from 
categorizing GPS tracking as a substitute for police surveillance. 
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all relied heavily on the 
proposition in Knotts that “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the 
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with 
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.”211  The Ninth 
Circuit Court in Pineda-Moreno reasoned, relying on Knotts, that where the 
information was gathered by an electronic device and that device was the 
substitute for an activity, like the police following the car on the streets, it was 
not a search.212  They further stated that since the only information the police 
obtained from the tracking device was a log of the locations the car traveled to, 
the police could have obtained this by following the car, and that fact also 
precluded the court from holding the action was a search.213  To drive home the 
point, the Ninth Circuit Court quoted Knotts, saying, “[w]e have never equated 
police efficiency with unconstitutionality and decline to do so now.”214 
The Garcia court made a similar argument, focusing more on the 
technological side.215  It looked at the differences between old technology 
(police following a suspect in a car) and new technology (cameras mounted on 
lampposts or using satellites to capture images of suspects on land).216  The 
court equated GPS with the new technology of mounting cameras on 
lampposts and using satellites to take pictures.217  They simply stated that if 
what the old technology did was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
neither was the new technology and thus, using the GPS was not a search.218  
In summary, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuit Courts argued that using a 
GPS to track a suspect’s location was not a search because it was solely 
 
 209. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 210. See Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (stating that the holding in Pineda-Moreno takes “quite a leap from what the 
Supreme Court actually held Knotts, which is that you have no expectation of privacy as against 
police who are conducting visual surveillance”). 
 211. 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
 212. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 213. Id. at 1216–17. 
 214. Id. at 1216 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284). 
 215. 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND UNWARRANTED GPS SURVEILLANCE 217 
substituting new technology for what the police could have done in person by 
following the suspect in a car.219 
The Knotts Court stated that it was acceptable for police to augment their 
sensory faculties with science and technology.220  Nevertheless, to extend this 
statement to include GPS tracking would be to take too many liberties with the 
facts and ignore certain realities that have significant impact on the Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  According to the Court, on the surface, police efficiency 
clearly does not equate with unconstitutional activity.221  However, one cannot 
solely rely on that argument from Knotts to justify any and all augmentations 
of police efficiency.  Of course, just because something is more advanced 
technologically does not mean that it is automatically unconstitutional or that 
the police will abuse the technology.  However, the Court has previously taken 
into account the fact that the Fourth Amendment implications might change 
when the technology does.  For instance, in Kyllo, the Court stated, “[w]hile 
the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt 
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”222  GPS tracking devices are a prime example of “more 
sophisticated systems” that require closer scrutiny in their use. 
The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts all relied heavily on Knotts 
in deciding that the use of a GPS was not a search, and, as such, it is necessary 
to analyze the actual differences between the beeper used in Knotts and GPS 
tracking devices, such as the one at issue in Maynard.  After that analysis, one 
can see that those circuits erred in relying on Knotts to the extent they did.  The 
Knotts Court predicated their argument on the fact that the technology used 
was very primitive,223 as compared to the vastly superior GPS technology that 
pinpoints an exact location at any time.224  The beeper device in Knotts was a 
battery operated radio transmitter that issued intermittent signals which police 
could pick up when they used a radio receiver.225  In contrast, a GPS device 
provides continuous, highly accurate, and reliable positioning and timing 
information to users, available to police over the Internet.226  The system 
functions through satellites that broadcast precise time signals, giving GPS 
devices more accurate readings than the signals received from beeper 
devices.227  In light of the considerable differences in accuracy between a GPS 
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device and a beeper, the two cannot be compared on equal grounds with 
respect to their use in police surveillance, and the holding regarding beepers in 
Knotts cannot, with good conscience, be used to support an analysis that 
equates beepers to the highly more accurate GPS devices.228 
Another critical distinction between a GPS device and a beeper is that the 
GPS functions entirely on its own, whereas the beeper in Knotts required 
police to be in the vicinity with a receiver in order to gain the information they 
wanted about the suspect’s whereabouts.229  Therefore, when the police 
activity at issue is using a GPS device to track a suspect, a court cannot 
logically make the argument that police are simply substituting one activity for 
another because the GPS does not require police presence to function; rather it 
only requires police presence at the time of attachment.  Since a GPS is 
fundamentally different from a beeper, that makes it even less similar to actual 
visual surveillance, and the Knotts analogy is inapplicable.230  This has 
incredible implications for the Fourth Amendment analysis and for courts’ 
ability to rely on Knotts in GPS cases.  For this reason, the Maynard court was 
correct not to equate the GPS and beeper technology. 
The view that using a GPS device is synonymous with police maintaining 
visual surveillance or using a beeper also ignores the practical and logistical 
difficulties police would have in duplicating the results of the month long, 
continuous tracking of a suspect using a GPS.  While it may be theoretically 
possible for the police to engage in such tracking without using a GPS, it is an 
unsustainable position given common limitations on police investigations, such 
as budgetary, time, and personnel issues.231  The drain on resources that would 
occur should police attempt to duplicate the results of GPS surveillance by 
actual visual surveillance would almost necessarily ensure a curtailed visual 
surveillance.  When surveillance techniques become so extensive that they 
cannot realistically be maintained by actual police personnel themselves, then 
the argument that police are simply augmenting their natural capabilities 
fails.232  GPS allows for prolonged surveillance that provides law enforcement 
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with a comprehensive, detailed, and lengthy record of one’s movements—a 
kind of record virtually impossible to obtain through visual surveillance or 
even beeper-attended surveillance, unless police resources were unlimited.233  
As a result of these differences, GPS tracking cannot be equated to beeper 
technology or to actual police surveillance, and, therefore, the D.C. Circuit 
Court was correct to decline to rely on this argument.234 
CONCLUSION 
The D.C. Circuit Court properly appreciated the limited holding of United 
States v. Knotts and declined to apply it to the situation in Maynard because, 
among other reasons, there is a significant difference between short-term 
surveillance and prolonged surveillance when defining a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.235  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit Court appropriately 
abstained from engaging in a “substituting activities” argument that both the 
Ninth and Seventh Circuit Courts relied on when they held that the 
unwarranted use of GPS tracking devices was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.236  As these activities are not comparable because of the practical 
realities of police capabilities and the advanced technology of GPS devices, 
they cannot be given the same status within the Fourth Amendment search 
analysis.237  Indeed, using a GPS device without a warrant to track a suspect’s 
movements twenty-four hours a day over the course of a month violates one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy and should be defined as a search within the 
Fourth Amendment, thus requiring law enforcement officials to obtain a 
warrant before such an investigation is initiated. 
The issue of modern technology’s impact on the Fourth Amendment 
presents courts with a difficult challenge, and the number of conflicts resulting 
will surely grow in the coming years as technology continues to develop as an 
integral part of life, crime, and crime prevention.  It will become increasingly 
important for courts to ensure law enforcement officials have the continued 
ability to protect the community against crime, while also recognizing and 
protecting the constitutional rights the Fourth Amendment is meant to bestow 
upon citizens.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took a step in the right 
direction on August 6, 2010, in holding that the unwarranted use of a GPS 
device to track a suspect’s movements over the course of a month was a search 
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, violated the 
suspect’s constitutional rights.238 
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